Before I begin, let me get one substantial issue out of the way. Recently certain views which are in many ways similar to Aristotle's have been expounded in connection with the idea that there is something wrong with the words "same" and "identical" used by themselves, and that we should instead make use of expressions of the form "same F" where "F" represents a general term. Aristotle, so far as I can find, never says any such thing, and although he does say a number of things which would seem to suggest, even perhaps to imply, such a view, and although he maintains that the word "same" carries many senses, he does not offer to resolve its ambiguity by coupling it with general terms. Indeed, he almost never uses "same" in this way, and only rarely thus uses his word for "one" ev3. I shall accordingly be doing without such couplings in what is to follow.
Type
text;
citation_publisher
Duke University Press
citation_firstpage
177
Citation_lastpage
197
citation_keywords
Leibniz' Law; Metaphysics; Greek philosophers
Subject (LCSH)
Identity; Philosophy;, Ancient
citation_language
eng;
Bibliographic Citation
White, N. (1971). Aristotle on sameness and oneness. Philosophical Review, 80, 177-97.
